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Kent M. Lee: Re-Interpreting Racial Attitudes: A Psychological Constructionist Model of Racial 
Attitudes 
(Under the direction of B. Keith Payne and Kristen A. Lindquist) 
 
Previous theories of racial attitudes have viewed attitudes as fixed associations between the 
subject of the attitude and an evaluation. According to these theories negative racial attitudes 
inevitably lead to negative evaluations of racial minorities. However, I propose a model in which 
attitudes are constructed dynamically and negative evaluations of racial minorities are not 
inevitable. I test the hypothesis that interpretation of negative affect toward African-Americans 
can alter the consequences of negative affect. In two online studies, participants’ negative 
affective reactions toward Blacks were measured. Participants then were informed that their 
negative affective reactions to Black individuals were due to sympathy, in one condition. In 
another condition participants were told that their affective reactions were due to sympathy. 
Results indicate that interpretation of negative affect toward African-Americans as sympathy, 
rather than fear, reduces self-reported fear of African-Americans. These studies provide 
empirical support for a novel psychological constructionist model of racial attitudes. 
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 Many Americans would like to believe that racial inequality is a problem of the past. 
Indeed, in the past few decades the number of Americans who report hostility toward racial 
minorities have steadily declined (Sniderman & Carmines, 1997). Concurrently, Americans have 
increasingly endorsed support racial equality (Bobo, 2001). Yet, a large number of Americans 
still tend to evaluate African-Americans more negatively than Whites (Nosek et al., 2007). To 
reconcile this apparent contradiction, many researchers have argued that despite people’s best 
intentions negative evaluations of African-Americans might still come to mind automatically and 
unintentionally (Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2004; Devine, 1989; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). 
According to researchers, many people have difficulty preventing automatically occurring 
negative evaluations of African-Americans from influencing their thoughts and behaviors. 
Therefore, much of the contemporary literature on this topic has focused on the existence of 
these automatic negative evaluations of African-Americans. In this paper, I examine some of the 
research and theoretical background informing current theories about these automatic negative 
evaluations. I then propose a novel model for understanding the nature of these automatic 
negative evaluations and provide empirical support for this model. Specifically, I argue that the 
interpretation of automatic negative evaluations of African-Americans determines their influence 
on subsequent thoughts and behaviors. 
Automatic Racial Attitudes and Their Measurement 
 Many researchers have argued that negative evaluations of African-Americans reflect the 
existence of negative racial attitudes (Banaji et al., 2004; Devine, 1989; Greenwald & Banaji, 
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1995). Some researchers have adopted the definition that an attitude is an association between 
the subject of the attitude and a positive or negative evaluation (Fazio, 1990, 2007; Petty, 2006; 
Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007). The subject of an attitude is known as an attitude object. An 
attitude object can be a person, idea, object, etc. Given this definition of an attitude, negative 
racial attitudes can be defined as an association between racial minorities and negative 
evaluations. Many contemporary theories of negative racial attitudes have focused on the 
automated and unintentional way in which these attitudes come to mind (Banaji et al., 2004; 
Devine, 1989; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). 
Researchers hypothesize that the formation of automatic negative racial attitudes is the inevitable 
result of exposure to negative stereotypes about racial minorities that exist within a culture. 
Stereotypes are “exaggerated beliefs associated with a category” (Allport, 1979, p. 191). For 
example, the portrayal of Black individuals as violent criminals in Western media may contribute 
to negative attitudes about African-Americans. Devine (1989) noted that even participants who 
intended to be fair to racial minorities (“low-prejudice” participants) were aware of negative 
stereotypes about African-Americans (e.g., Blacks are aggressive).  
 Of course, measuring racial attitudes can be difficult. For example, self-report 
questionnaires, which directly ask participants about their attitudes toward racial minorities, 
provide participants the opportunity to modify or conceal the influence of automatically activated 
racial attitudes on their verbal reports. In other words, self-report questionnaires afford 
participants the opportunity to direct intentional, controlled, and effortful mental processes to 
override the influence of automatically activated attitudes (see Evans, 2008 for an overview of 
theories discussing controlled and automatic processes). In response to the limitations of self-
report measures of racial attitudes, researchers have developed a set of techniques often referred 
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to as indirect measures. Indirect measures do not rely on introspective access or self-report 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Instead, indirect measures work primarily because they make it 
difficult for participants to control or modify their performance on these measures (Fazio & 
Olson, 2003). To put it in another way, indirect measures make it difficult for participants to 
overriding the influence of their automatically activated attitudes on their responses in these 
measures.  
 One example of such an indirect measure is Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In a typical IAT examining racial attitudes toward African-
Americans, participants are asked to categorize whether a pictured individual is Black by 
pressing one key (e.g., I) or White by pressing a different key (e.g., E). Similarly, in a different 
block participants are also asked to categorize adjectives as positive or negative words. During 
the critical blocks in the IAT, the categories are combined such that participants are presented 
with both pictures of individuals and adjectives within the same block. In one of the critical 
blocks, the categories “positive” and “White” might be paired on the same key. Similarly, 
“negative” and “Black” would be paired on the other key. In a different critical trial, these 
pairings are reversed. The logic is that participants find the task easier if the categories which 
occupy the same key are consistent with participants’ attitudes (e.g., Black – Negative). 
Participants are able to respond faster when the task is easy.  In contrast, when the categories 
paired on the same key are inconsistent with participants’ attitudes (e.g., Black – Positive) the 
participants will find the task more difficult. This difficulty slows down participants’ responses. 
Thus, participants who respond faster when Black and negative are paired on the same key are 
believed to associate Black individuals with negative adjectives. As a result, these participants 
are said to have negative racial attitudes toward African-Americans.  
   
  4 
Attitudes as Stable Representations in Memory 
Much of the reasoning  indirect measures such as the IAT originates from the perspective 
that attitudes are stable representations stored in memory  (Fazio, 1990, 2007; Petty, 2006; Petty 
et al., 2007). Researchers who adopt the perspective that attitudes are stable representations have 
viewed attitudes as entities, which exist within long-term memory and are relatively resistant to 
change. These researchers have also argued that attitudes are automatically activated when 
encountering a relevant attitude object. Thus, a person who possesses negative attitudes toward 
African-Americans will have these attitudes automatically come to mind whenever he or she 
encounters an African-American individual. For these reasons some attitudes researchers have 
viewed indirect measures as able to capture “true” attitudes. 
For example, a classic paper describes indirect measures as a “bona-fide pipeline” to 
participants’ attitudes (Fazio et al., 1995). In a series of studies Fazio and colleagues examined 
participants’ racial attitudes using both self-report questionnaires and indirect measures. 
Participants tended to evaluate African-Americans more negatively on the indirect measure, but 
not in self-report. Importantly, participants who possessed greater motivation to appear non-
prejudiced showed the greatest differences in terms of their responses on indirect compared to 
direct measures. In contrast, participants who were less motivated to conceal negative racial 
attitudes showed a similar degree of negative racial attitudes on indirect and self-report measures 
of negative racial attitudes. Fazio et al. concluded that indirect measures, unlike self-report 
measures, provided a direct line to participants’ attitudes.  
Both the MODE model of attitudes (Fazio 1990, 2007) and the Meta-Cognitive Model of 
attitudes (Petty, 2006; Petty et al., 2007) are examples of models which assume attitudes are 
stable representations. The MODE model was one of the first theories to offer an explanation of 
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the relationship between automatically and deliberately activated attitudes (Fazio, 1990, 2007). 
Consistent with the assumption that attitudes are stable representations, the MODE model views 
attitudes as associations between an evaluation and an attitude object. Fazio (2007) argued that 
the link between evaluation and attitude object strengthens as attitudes become well learned. 
Attitudes with stronger links between evaluations and attitude objects will be more likely to be 
activated when a person encounters an attitude object. According to Fazio (1990, 2007), attitudes 
can spontaneous guide behavior. However, Fazio argued that controlled processes can also direct 
behavior. Thus, the ability of attitudes to influence behavior depends on whether a person is 
motivated to alter the behavior guided by an automatically activated attitude and whether the 
person has the opportunity to do so. Fazio’s (1990, 2007) logic is that because indirect measures 
deny or limit the ability of sufficiently motivated participants to conceal or override the influence 
of their racial attitudes on responses, indirect measures directly tap into activated attitudes. 
Further, Fazio (1990, 2007) argued that verbal report on direct measures of racial attitudes 
reflects verbal behavior, which offers the opportunity for sufficiently motivated participants to 
conceal or alter the responses prompted by their racial attitudes. In this way, the MODE model 
interprets responses on indirect measures as indices of the well-learned and enduring racial 
attitudes that participants have developed over the course of their lives. 
Similarly, the Meta-Cognitive Model also views attitudes as associations between 
evaluations and attitude objects, which are stored in long-term memory (Petty, 2006; Petty et al., 
2007). According to Petty and colleagues’ (2006, 2007) Meta-Cognitive Model, attitude objects 
have associations of varying strengths with different evaluations. Interestingly, Petty and 
colleagues have posited that an attitude object can be linked simultaneously to positive and 
negative evaluations. Like the MODE model, the Meta-Cognitive Model assumes that indirect 
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measures capture activation of attitudes with the strongest attitude object-evaluative links, which 
are spontaneously and rapidly activated. Unlike the MODE model, however, the Meta-Cognitive 
Model argues that an individual can have “metacognitive tags.” Metacognitive tags reflect 
additional information associated with the attitude (i.e., the attitude object-evaluation 
association) as a whole. Petty and colleagues have argued that these metacognitive tags might 
include information about whether one believes an attitude is true, valid, socially acceptable to 
express, etc. Further, they have posited that it takes longer to activate metacognitive information 
about an attitude. Therefore, according to Petty et al., the deliberative nature of explicit measures 
allows individuals to access this metacognitive information. In contrast, indirect measures, which 
require rapid and spontaneous responses, do not allow enough time for metacognitive 
information to be accessed. Thus, the metacognitive model argues that it is the opportunity to 
draw information from metacognitive tags which determines the differences between indirect 
and direct measures of racial attitudes. 
Despite the differences that exist between them, the metacognitive model and the MODE 
model, ultimately predict that indirect measures capture automatically activated attitudes. These 
automatically activated attitudes reside in memory as entities which are well-established and 
stable. Further, both models argue that these attitudes reflect tendencies to evaluate attitude 
objects in a particular way. Therefore, both models interpret indirect measures as revealing 
“true” negative attitudes about racial minorities. 
Negative Attitudes or Negative Affect? 
Taken together, the theories about automatic negative racial attitudes and attitudes as 
stable entities paint a rather dismal picture for the future relations between racial groups. After 
all, if stable negative racial attitudes can be formed through exposure to culture and these 
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attitudes are activated automatically (Banaji et al., 2004; Devine, 1989; Fazio, 1990, 2007; 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Petty, 2006; Petty et al., 2007), then negative racial attitudes are 
inescapable. Yet, there is a question of whether indirect measures are capturing fixed negative 
evaluations arising from activation of attitudes or general negative core affect. Core affect is a 
source of bodily information that reflects a mental representation of one’s homeostatic state, 
which is experienced as pleasure or displeasure with some degree of arousal (Russell, 2005, 
2009; Russell & Barrett, 1999). Pleasure or displeasure might also be referred to positive and 
negative affect. 
The question of whether indirect measures capture negative racial attitudes or negative 
affect is important because many indirect measures of attitudes examine global evaluations, such 
positive or negative associations with racial minorities. Yet, the presence of negative associations 
with African-Americans might not be an evaluation of African-Americans at all. Instead, it might 
reflect anxiety about interacting with a group that one is unfamiliar with or even anxiety that one 
will be perceived as racist. For example, White participants often possess anxiety about being 
perceived as racist by minority group members (Vorauer, Main, & O’Connell, 1998). When 
White participants believed they are being stereotyped as racist by minority group members, they 
find intergroup interactions to be more unpleasant (Vorauer et al., 1998). Thus, negative 
associations with racial minorities could stem from negative core affect in response to the 
situation, rather than the individuals involved. This finding calls into question whether indirect 
measures are capturing negative racial attitudes or general negative core affect. 
Consistent with the findings of Vorauer and colleagues (1998), work by Lambert et al. 
(2003) demonstrated that anxiety was associated with greater stereotyping. In one study, Lambert 
and colleagues manipulated participants’ expectations about whether their responses on an 
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indirect measure of stereotyping, the Weapons Identification Task (WIT; Payne, 2001), would be 
private or public. In the WIT, participants see a pair of images: a picture of a Black or White 
individual and a picture of a tool or weapon. Participants are instructed to ignore the picture of 
the person and to judge whether the object presented was a tool or a weapon. Lambert et al. 
found the typical stereotype priming effect. That is, White participants were more likely to 
mistake a harmless tool for a weapon after being shown a picture of a Black individual, 
compared to a picture of a White individual. However, participants showed a greater stereotype 
priming effect on the WIT when they believed that their responses would be made public rather 
than kept private. Further, participants in the public condition demonstrated greater anxiety and 
decreased ability to control stereotyping compared to participants in the private condition. 
Interestingly, participants in the public condition demonstrated poorer control on the WIT if they 
had greater anxiety. Consistent with more traditional perspectives of attitudes (Fazio, 1990; 
Petty, 2006; Petty et al., 2007), these findings suggest that when the opportunity to exert 
controlled process is reduced, via anxiety, participants are likely to be guided by their 
automatically activated stereotypes. Thus, stereotype-consistent priming in the public condition 
likely reflects the presence of automatically activated negative racial attitudes. However, these 
findings by Lambert and colleagues are also consistent with findings demonstrating that anxiety 
about being perceived as prejudiced contributes to negative affect felt during encounters with 
racial minority group members that may have nothing to do with negative stereotypes about 
these racial minorities (Vorauer et al., 1998). 
Uhlmann and colleagues (2005) directly tested the hypothesis that indirect measures such 
as the IAT may not differentiate between dislike of African-Americans and sympathy for 
African-Americans. For example, in one study, Uhlmann and colleagues found that while White 
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participants were faster to associate negative words with African-Americans than Whites, they 
were also more likely to associate words related to oppression with African-Americans compared 
to Whites. Taking this a step further, the researchers presented participants with information 
about two fictional groups. One group was given a history of oppression, while the other was 
not. On a subsequent IAT, participants were quicker to associate the fictional group that had 
faced a history of oppression with negative words, compared to the group that had not faced 
oppression. Uhlmann and colleagues interpreted their findings as demonstrating that the IAT 
might not differentiate between anti-social negative emotions (e.g., antipathy, fear) and more 
prosocial emotions characterized by negative affect (e.g., sympathy). These findings call into 
question the interpretation that negative associations on indirect measures reflect negative racial 
attitudes per se. Instead, these results suggest that negative associations toward a minority group 
may be indicative of negative core affect generally, rather than negative racial attitudes. This is 
an important distinction, because negative core affect characterizes the experience of both dislike 
as well as sympathy. 
Interestingly, there is direct evidence that negative core affect to a minority group can 
have multiple meanings. Specifically, the way in which participants interpreted their negative 
core affect determines the meaning of their core affective state (Cooley, Payne, & Phillips, 
2014). In one study, participants completed an indirect measure of their feelings to pictures of 
straight and gay couples. Cooley et al. then led participants to believe that negative core affect in 
response to pictures of gay couples were intentional in one condition, and that they were 
unintentional in another condition. As their indirect measure, Cooley and colleagues used the 
Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). In the AMP, 
participants are presented with a real life image and a Chinese pictograph. Participants are 
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instructed to judge whether they find the Chinese pictograph pleasant by pressing one key (e.g., 
“I”) or unpleasant by pressing a different key (e.g., “E”). Participants are also instructed to do 
their best not to be influenced by the real life image in their judgments. The logic of the AMP is 
that participants will have an affective reaction to the real life image regardless of instructions, 
but misattribute this reaction to the Chinese pictograph. The pictograph functions as an 
ambiguous stimulus and it is assumed that participants who cannot read Chinese will have no 
consistent affective reactions to the pictographs. Cooley et al. found that participants with more 
negative core affect in response to pictures of gay couples (as measured by AMP performance) 
tended endorse greater homophobia, but only if they interpreted their negative core affect as 
intentional. In contrast, participants who demonstrated negative core affect in response to 
pictures of gay couples endorsed less homophobia when they interpreted negative core affect as 
unintended. In other words, only when participants interpreted their negative core affect as 
intentional, did they endorse greater homophobia. The findings of Cooley et al. suggest that the 
meaning of negative core affective responses to minority group members can be malleable. This 
is consistent with a psychological constructionist perspective, described next. 
Psychological Constructionism 
 Much of the evidence supporting the psychological constructionist framework comes 
from the field affective science. Psychological constructionist theories of emotion posit that 
emotions do not exist as entities in the mind, but rather are constructed from more basic 
components (Barrett, 2006, 2009, 2012; Lindquist, 2013). Core affective information is one key 
component in the construction of emotions. Situational information is another important 
component (Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, Simmons, & Barsalou, 2011). Intuitively, situational 
information in this case includes the setting, objects, and individuals in the present situation. 
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Less intuitively, however, situational information also includes the actions and experiences of the 
individuals who are a part of the current situation. In addition to core affect and situational 
information, conceptual knowledge also plays a key role in the construction of emotions (Barrett, 
2006, 2009; Lindquist, 2013). Broadly defined, a concept can be thought of as information about 
categories (Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003). For example, in the case of emotions, 
relevant conceptual knowledge might include knowledge about emotion categories (e.g., fear, 
sadness, anger; Barrett, 2009; Lindquist, 2013). 
 Emotions are constructed through interpretation of core affect, situational information, 
and conceptual knowledge about emotions. In an illustrative study, researchers manipulated 
participants’ core affective state and their access to conceptual knowledge about emotion 
categories (Lindquist & Barrett, 2008). Specifically, the researchers induced negative affect in 
participants in one condition and neutral affect in another condition. Following affective 
induction, all the participants then were randomly assigned to receive a fear prime in one 
condition, an anger prime in a second condition, or a neutral prime in a third condition. 
Afterward, as a measure of participants’ experience of fear, participants rated how likely they 
were to engage in risky behavior. Overall, the participants induced to experience negative affect 
and primed with fear endorsed less risky activity than the other groups. The findings from this 
study demonstrate how emotions (e.g., fear) are constructed using core affective information and 
conceptual knowledge. Specifically, when participants experienced a negative core affective 
state and conceptual knowledge about fear was activated, they interpreted their core affective 
state as fear. 
 Although much of the work on psychological constructionist theories originates in 
affective science, the processes involved in the construction of emotion are hypothesized to be 
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domain general (Barrett, 2006, 2009, 2012; Lindquist, 2013). Psychological constructionist 
theories hypothesize that many of the psychological phenomena commonly studied in 
psychology (e.g., emotions, attitudes, prejudice) are constructed from these domain general 
processes. From a psychological constructionist perspective, attitudes are not simply entities that 
are stored in long-term memory, waiting to be activated. Instead, attitudes may emerge from core 
affect and relevant situational information. In other words, attitudes may be dynamically 
constructed to fit the present situation, just as emotions are. 
 Indeed, evidence that situational information can influence responses on indirect 
measures of racial attitudes provides suggestive evidence that attitudes may be constructed. For 
example, Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park (2001) found that participants’ responses on an indirect 
measure are sensitive to the setting in which an individual is presented. Wittenbrink and 
colleagues presented participants with images of Black and White individuals with either a 
church interior or a graffiti covered street corner as the background. Demonstrating the influence 
of context on of racial attitudes, participants tended to respond negatively to images of Black 
individuals on a street corner. In contrast, participants tended to respond positively to images of 
Black individuals in a church interior. Wittenbrink et al.’s findings challenge the perspective that 
attitudes are stable representations, which are stored in long-term memory and await activation. 
In sum, Wittenbrink and colleagues’ findings suggest that attitudes are flexible phenomena that 
are sensitive to contextual information. 
 Similarly, Barden, Maddux, Petty, and Brewer (2004) examined how participants’ 
perceptions about the roles of African-American individuals influenced their responses on 
indirect measures. In one study, Barden and colleagues found that participants tended to make 
positive evaluations about pictures of Black individuals with a basketball court in the 
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background. In contrast, participants tended to make negative evaluations about Black 
individuals when the background was a classroom. In other words, participants’ evaluations of 
African-Americans were contingent on whether their role was implied to be that of an athlete or 
student. Similarly, in a second study, Barden and colleagues found that participants made 
negative evaluations of African-Americans in a prison setting led to negative evaluations if the 
African-American individuals were wearing prison uniforms. If the African-American 
individuals were wearing suits instead of prison uniforms, however, participants tended to 
evaluate them positively. In other words, participants evaluated African-American individuals 
negatively if the clothes they were wearing implied a prisoner role, rather than a lawyer role. 
 These findings are supportive of a psychological constructionist model of racial attitudes. 
That is, attitudes are dynamically constructed to fit the present moment via interpretation of core 
affect, situational information, and conceptual knowledge. When a setting appeared dangerous 
(e.g., graffiti street), participants likely drew on negative stereotypes (e.g., graffiti as sign of 
criminal activity) to evaluate the individual in that setting. Similarly, when a Black individual 
was presented in a basketball court, rather than a classroom, participants used this information to 
infer their roles athletes. This inference led participants to make positive judgments about these 
African-American individuals. The participants likely drew on the stereotypes that African-
Americans are good at sports, but bad at academics, to inform their evaluations of the African-
Americans they viewed in the pictures. One interpretation of the findings of Wittenbrink et al. 
(2001) and Barden et al. (2004) is that situational information altered the types of conceptual 
knowledge (stereotypes in this case) that participants used to construct an attitudes about the 
Black individuals that they saw. Therefore findings provide suggestive support for a 
psychological constructionist theory of racial attitudes. However, stronger evidence for a 
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psychological constructionist model would include a demonstration of how interpretation can 
shape pre-existing core affective responses. Specifically, can interpretation shape whether pro-
social, rather than anti-social, emotions emerge from participants’ core affective reactions to 
African-Americans? The purpose of the present studies is to investigate this question. 
The Current Studies 
My psychological constructionist approach to prejudice suggests that negative affect does 
not reflect negative racial attitudes per se. Similarly, negative affect does not necessarily result in 
emotions (e.g., fear, antipathy) that might motivate anti-social behavior harmful to racial 
minorities. Instead, interpretation of core affect and situational information is what determines 
which emotions emerge from negative affect. Specifically, the interpretation process may draw 
from conceptual knowledge about emotions to make meaning of core affect and situational 
information. My psychological construction theory also suggests that one way to reduce anti-
social emotions toward racial minorities would be to change how individuals interpret their 
negative core affect. I predict that increasing participants’ accessibility to conceptual knowledge 
about sympathy, as opposed to fear, will result reduced fear toward African-Americans. 
In Study 1, I had participants complete an AMP (Payne et al., 2005) to measure their core 
affective responses to African-Americans. After the AMP, I administered the experimental 
manipulation. In the manipulation I informed participants that any “negative feelings” they felt 
toward African-Americans during the AMP may reflect either fear or sympathy toward because 
of the status of Black Americans in American society. I randomly assigned participants to one of 
two conditions. In one condition I suggested to participants that any “negative feelings” they 
experienced toward African-Americans during the AMP reflected fear and instructed participants 
generate 2 to 3 reasons why their “negative feelings” might be due to fear of African-Americans. 
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In another condition I suggested that any “negative feelings” reflect sympathy for African-
Americans, and asked participants to generate 2 to 3 reasons why their “negative feelings” might 
reflect sympathy for African-Americans. Next, I measured participants’ self-reported fear and 
sympathy toward African-Americans. I predicted that individuals with greater automatic 
negative affect toward African-Americans, measured by the AMP, would report more fear and 
less sympathy toward African-Americans, but only in the fear condition. I also predicted that 
participants with greater negative affect toward African-Americans on the AMP would report 
greater sympathy and less fear in the sympathy condition. 
  
   





 Participants. I recruited 201 adult online participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. I 
excluded 17 of these participants from analyses. Of these participants, nine did not complete the 
study, four indicated they could speak Chinese which reduces the ambiguity of the stimuli in the 
AMP, one participant’s responses on the AMP were not correctly recorded due to a computer 
error, and one participant correctly guessed the hypothesis of the study. Additionally, two 
participants did not follow instructions and only responded by pressing the same key on all trials 
of the AMP (e.g., they only pressed “Q” on all trials) so their data were not valid. The remaining 
183 participants ranged in age from 18 to 72 years (M = 36.07, standard deviation [SD] = 13.13) 
and 53% were female (47% male). Of these participants, 82.6% identified as White, 6.6% as 
African-American, 3.8% as Asian, 4.4% as Hispanic/Latino, 1.1% Native American/Pacific 
Islander and 1.5% as “Other.” I computed the analyses with and without African-American 
participants and found no differences. Additionally, African-Americans participants have been 
exposed to the same cultural stereotypes about members of their own racial group as participants 
identifying as other races. For these reasons I decided to include these participants in my 
analyses. 
 Procedure. Following the consent process, I administered the AMP to participants to 
measure automatic negative affect toward African-Americans. Participants completed 40 trials of 
the AMP in which they viewed a prime for 125ms followed by a Chinese character for 100ms, 
and finally by a visual mask which remained onscreen until participants responded. The primes 
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included 20 photographs of Black individuals and 20 photographs of White individuals. I 
instructed participants to judge the Chinese characters as either pleasant or unpleasant. I warned 
the participants that the primes (“the real life pictures”) might influence their judgment of the 
Chinese character and so they should do their best not to be influenced by the photographs. 
Participants pressed the “Q” key if they found the character unpleasant and the “P” key if they 
found the character pleasant.  
 Following the AMP, I manipulated participants’ interpretations of their feelings toward 
African-Americans. I drew my manipulation from previous studies demonstrating that 
interpretations about one’s automatic thoughts about homosexual couples can influence self-
reported homophobia (Cooley et al., 2014). In one condition, I informed the participants that 
their automatic negative affect reflected sympathy for Black Americans while in another 
condition I told the participants that their automatic negative affect reflected fear. The 
instructions I used are below: 
Research has demonstrated that White Americans commonly hold negative associations 
with Blacks compared to Whites (i.e., Whites often are quicker to associate “Bad” with a 
picture of a Black face compared to a White face). Empirical evidence suggests that these 
negative associations are often due to feelings of sympathy [fear] because of beliefs about 
the status of Blacks in American society. Please generate two or three reasons why any 
negative feelings you may have felt toward Black faces might reflect sympathy for [fear 
of] Black Americans. Type the reasons you generate in the box below. 
 
 After the manipulation I asked participants to rate three statements regarding fear of 
African-Americans (“Blacks are threatening,” “Blacks are scary,” “Blacks are frightening) and 
three statements regarding sympathy for African-Americans (“Blacks continue to face 
oppression,” “Blacks are unfairly looked down upon,” “Blacks are unfairly harassed”). 
Participants responded by rating how true each statement was on a 1-5 scale, with 1 being 
“Never true” and 5 being “Always true.” 
   
  18 
Next, I examined explicit affect by having participants rate how pleasant or unpleasant 
they found the Black and White individuals from the real life images used in the AMP. 
Participants responded using a -4 to +4 scale, with -4 being “Very unpleasant,” 0 being “Neutral” 
and +4 being “Very pleasant.”  
 Afterwards I asked participants for demographic information including age, race, sex, and 
whether they were able to read Chinese. Finally I asked participants to guess the purpose of the 
study to gauge for suspicion before debriefing them. 
Results 
 Preliminary analyses.  As preliminary analyses, I first examined the overall responses of 
my sample on the AMP, participants’ explicit affect ratings, and the dependent measure of fear 
and sympathy toward Blacks. I also examined the reliability of the fear and sympathy toward 
Blacks scales. On the AMP, participants made a greater proportion of “unpleasant” responses 
following Black primes (M = .47, SD = .22) compared to White primes (M = .39, SD = .20), F (1, 
182) = 16.99, p < .001, η2 = .08. I computed an overall AMP score by subtracting the proportion 
of “unpleasant” responses following White primes from the proportion of “unpleasant” responses 
following Black primes. Thus, a higher score on the AMP reflects more automatic negative 
affect toward African-Americans. 
 Next, I recoded the scale for the explicit affect ratings from -4 (Very unpleasant) to 4 
(Very pleasant) into a 1 to 9 scale, with 9 being “Very unpleasant,” 1 being “Very pleasant,” and 
5 being the “Neutral” midpoint. I computed a difference score by subtracting the participants’ 
mean explicit ratings of images of White individuals from the mean explicit ratings of images of 
Black individuals. Therefore, higher numbers on this scale reflect greater explicit negative affect 
toward Blacks compared to Whites. Participants rated photos of Black individuals (M = 4.96, SD 
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= 1.10) as more unpleasant than photos of White individuals (M = 4.72, SD = .93), F (1, 182) = 
6.86, p = .01, η2 = .04 overall. 
 I took the average of the relevant items that composed the fear toward Blacks scale and 
sympathy toward Blacks scale to compute a score for each scale. As a whole, participants 
expressed more sympathy for African-Americans (M = 2.96, SD = .96) than fear (M = 2.05, SD 
=.72), F (1, 182) = 92.30, p < .001, η2 = .34 overall. I also examined the reliability of the scales. 
The measures of fear (Cronbach’s α = .89) and sympathy (α = .87) toward African-Americans 
demonstrated good reliability. 
 Primary analyses. After completing preliminary analyses, I tested my primary 
hypotheses. I was primarily interested in whether interpretation of automatic negative affect 
toward African-Americans as sympathy, or fear, would moderate the relationship between 
automatic negative affect and self-reported sympathy and fear toward African-Americans. I 
estimated the parameters of a regression model predicting fear of African-Americans from 
automatic negative affect, emotion condition, and their interaction. Prior to the analysis, I 
converted all of my variables to z-scores in order to standardize them. 
 I plotted the regression slopes for automatic core affect and fear of African-Americans 
for each emotion condition in Figure 1. There was a main effect of automatic negative affect, b = 
.24, t (179) = 3.23, p = .001, but not emotion condition, b = .02, t (179) = .29, p = .77. 
Importantly, the predicted interaction between automatic negative affect and emotion condition 
was significant, b = .17, t (179) = 2.34, p = .02. The simple slopes analysis revealed that 
participants with more automatic negative affective responses toward Blacks reported 
significantly greater fear toward Blacks in the fear condition, b = .39, t (86) = 4.18, p < .001. The 
association between automatic negative affect and self-reported fear of Blacks was not 
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significant in the sympathy condition, b = .05, t (93) = .44, p = .66. Comparison of the simple 
slopes revealed that participants with higher levels of automatic negative affect responses to 
African-Americans reported significantly more fear toward Blacks in the fear condition, relative 
to the sympathy condition, t (179) = 2.34, p < .05. 
 I also examined the effect of the interpretation on the relationship between automatic core 
affect and sympathy. I estimated the regression parameters for a model predicting sympathy for 
Blacks from automatic core affect and the interaction of automatic negative affect x emotion 
condition. There was a main effect of automatic negative affect, such that participants lower in 
automatic negative affect toward African-Americans endorsed more sympathy for Blacks, b = -
.24, t (179) = 3.33, p = .001. However, differences in sympathy ratings did not differ by emotion 
condition, b = -.03, t (179) = .36, p = .72. Additionally, the predicted interaction of automatic 
negative affect and emotion condition was not significant, b = -.01, t (179) = .84, p = .93. 
 Finally, I examined whether interpretation moderated the relationship between automatic 
negative affect and explicit affect ratings of the photos of Black and White individuals. Using 
regression analysis, I predicted explicit affect from automatic negative affect, emotion condition, 
and their interaction. I plotted the regression slopes in Figure 2. There was a main effect of 
automatic negative affect, b = .39, t (179) = 5.74, p < .001, while the main effect of emotion 
condition trended toward significance, b = .11, t (179) = 1.63, p = .105. Importantly, the 
interaction between automatic negative affect and emotion condition was significant, b = .23, t 
(179) = 3.41, p = .001. Simple slopes analyses revealed that participants with more automatic 
negative affect toward African-Americans demonstrated more negative explicit affect toward 
African-Americans in the fear condition, b = .60, t (86) = 5.43, p < .001, compared to the 
sympathy condition, b = .14, t (93) = 1.96, p = .053. Comparison of simple slopes revealed that 
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participants with greater automatic negative affect reported significantly more explicit negative 
affect toward pictures of Black individuals in the fear condition compared to the sympathy 
condition t (179) = 3.41, p < .001. 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 1 are consistent with my hypothesis that interpretation of automatic 
negative affect toward African-Americans as sympathy, as opposed to fear, can reduce the 
amount of fear and explicit negative affect toward African-Americans. Interpretation of 
automatic negative affect as sympathy, however, did not increase endorsed sympathy for 
African-Americans. However, it is unclear why participants’ reported sympathy for Blacks 
would not show a corresponding pattern to reported fear. One possibility may be that the fear 
items used direct synonyms with fear (e.g., threatening, scary, frightening), while the sympathy 
items did not. Indeed, there are few words that are synonymous with “deserving of sympathy” in 
same the way that there are synonyms for “frightening.” This may have meant that my measure 
of sympathy was less able to capture sympathy as consistently compared to the fear’s ability to 
capture fear of Blacks. For example, participants may have interpreted each sympathy item 
differently compared to the other sympathy items. 
Despite not finding increased sympathy when participants interpreted their negative 
affect as sympathy, the results are still promising. These findings demonstrate that interpretation 
can change the meaning of automatic negative affect toward a racial minority group for 
participants. Particularly, the results show that interpretation can reduce the amount of expressed 
fear of African-Americans. By illustrating that the meaning of automatic negative affect toward 
African-Americans is malleable rather than fixed, the results of Study 1 speak against the 
perspective that attitudes are stable representations. Rather, these findings are consistent with my 
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psychological constructionist model, which proposes interpretation of core affect can shape the 
evaluations made about racial minorities. Next, I sought to replicate and extend these findings in 
Study 2. 
In particular, I was interested in whether participants experienced changes in their 
affective experience as self-focused or world-focused (see Lambie & Marcel, 2002; Lindquist, 
2013; and Lindquist & Barrett, 2008 for discussions). Self-focused experiences can be thought of 
as a person’s interpretation of his or her own reactions to stimuli (e.g., I am afraid of Black 
people). In contrast, world-focused experiences can be thought of as our perceptions of the 
stimuli themselves (e.g., Black people are frightening). Psychological constructionist theories of 
emotion view self-focused and world-focused experiences to be different aspects of the same 
phenomenon (Lindquist, 2013). According to Lindquist (2013) the difference is whether bodily 
(self-focused) or situational (world-focused) information is placed in the foreground.  
Specifically, I was interested in examining whether the experimental manipulation caused 
participants to change how they viewed their reactions to Black individuals or their perceptions 
of Black individuals. 
  
   






Participants. I recruited 202 adult participants online through Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Of these participants, 25
1
 did not finish the study, nine participants pressed the same key on the 
AMP for every trial, and five indicated that they were able to read Chinese. These participants 
were excluded from analyses, leaving 163 participants. Of the remaining participants (53.4% 
female, 46.6% male), ages ranged from 18 to 73 (M =  35.90, SD = 12.29) and 90.2% identified 
as White, 1.8% identified as African-American, 1.2% identified as Hispanic/Latino, 1.2% 
identified as Asian, 1.8% identified as “Other,” and 3.7% opted not to provide their race. As in 
Study 1, I conducted analyses with and without African-American participants and found no 
differences between the two sets of analyses. As a result, I included the African-American 
participants’ responses in the analyses, just as I did in Study 1. 
 Emotion questions. The only element that differed from Study 1 was the addition of new 
questions examining feelings of fear and sympathy toward African-Americans. Specifically, 
                                                          
1
 Twenty-four of the 25 participants who did not complete the study were all from the “fear” condition. Further, 
these 24 participants either stopped after completing the AMP or after completing the task in the manipulation. 
There were no differences in their proportion of unpleasant responses following Black primes, F (1, 200) = .52, p = 
.47, η2 < .01, or White primes, F (1, 200) < .01, p = .95, η2 < .01. Participants who generated responses for the task in 
the manipulation ranged from those who expressed prejudice toward African-Americans to those who were 
sympathetic to African-Americans. The remaining participant did not complete the manipulation and it is unknown 
which condition they were in. Overall, this suggests that there were no differences in terms of automatic negative 
affect toward African-Americans on the AMP. I cannot, however, rule out the possibility that these participants 
reacted systematically in some way to the instructions to the fear condition. Of the participants who generated 2-3 
reasons why their automatic negative affect might reflect fear of African-Americans, their reports were not 
qualitatively different than responses generated by other participants in the fear condition who completed the 
experiment. 
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these were questions about world focused and self-focused emotions (see Appendix). In doing 
so, I also expanded the original scales, which were comprised of only world-focused items. 
 Procedure. As in Study 1, participants first completed the AMP after the consent 
process. They were then randomly assigned to receive either the fear or sympathy emotion 
manipulation. After the emotion manipulation, participants answered questions about fear and 
sympathy toward African-Americans. Next, participants provided ratings of the pleasantness of 
the photos of White and Black individuals used as primes in the AMP.  I then asked participants 
to provide demographic information including age, sex, race, and ability to read Chinese. Finally 
participants were asked to guess the purpose of the study. No participants were able to accurately 
guess the hypothesis of the experiment. 
Results 
 Preliminary analyses. As in Study 1, I first conducted preliminary analyses examining 
the overall responses of the sample on the AMP, the explicit affect measure, and the dependent 
measures of fear and sympathy toward Blacks. I also examined the reliability of the original and 
expanded scales for fear and sympathy toward Blacks. For the AMP, I computed scores for 
Black and White primes by taking the proportion of negative responses for each type of prime. 
Overall, participants made a greater proportion of “unpleasant” responses following Black 
primes (M = .44, SD = .24) than after White primes (M = .36, SD = .20), F (1, 162) = 13.33, p < 
.001, η2 = .08 on the AMP.  
Next, I examined items from the original scales for fear and sympathy toward African-
Americans (see Appendix). I computed scores for each scale by taking the mean of the three 
items from each scale. Participants reported more sympathy toward Blacks (M = 2.37, SD = .90) 
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than fear (M = 2.02, SD = .63), F (1, 162) = 14.56, p < .001, η2 = .08 overall. As in Study 1, the 
fear (α = .89) and sympathy (α = .83) toward Blacks scales showed good reliability. 
As with Study 1, the scale for the affect judgments of the pictures of Black and White 
individuals ranged from -4 (Very unpleasant) to +4 (Very pleasant). I recoded the scale into a 1-9 
scale, with 9 being “Very unpleasant” and 1 being “Very pleasant.” Thus higher numbers reflect 
greater negative affect. I then took separate averages for the ratings of the images of White 
individuals and Black individuals. As in Study 1, I created a difference score by subtracting the 
average rating for images of White individuals from the average rating for images of Black 
individuals. Thus, higher scores reflect greater explicit negative affect toward Blacks. The 
participants rated photos of Black individuals (M = 5.04, SD = 1.23), as more unpleasant than 
photos of White individuals (M = 4.78, SD = .86), F (1, 162) = 5.45, p = .02, η2 = .03 overall.  
 Replication with previous emotion scales.  Before the analyses, I standardized all of the 
variables by converting them to z-scores. To replicate the findings from Study 1, I computed a 
score reflecting fear of African-Americans by taking the mean of responses to the three fear 
items that I used in the original scale (see Appendix).  Similarly, I computed a score for 
sympathy toward African-Americans by taking the mean of the responses to items the in the 
original sympathy scale (see Appendix). I also computed a difference score reflecting automatic 
core affect toward African-Americans by subtracting the proportion of “unpleasant” responses 
following White primes from the proportion of “unpleasant” responses following Black primes. 
Thus, higher numbers reflect greater automatic negative affect toward African-Americans, 
relative to White Americans. 
 Based on the findings in Study 1, I predicted that participants with greater automatic 
negative affect would report less fear toward African-Americans when automatic negative affect 
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was interpreted as sympathy, as opposed to fear. I conducted a regression analysis predicting fear 
of African-Americans from automatic negative affect, emotion condition, and their interaction. I 
plotted the regression slopes in Figure 3. I found a main effect of automatic negative affect, b = 
.38, t (159) = 5.25, p < .001, but no main effect of emotion condition, b = .01, t (159) = .14, p = 
.89. Importantly, I found an interaction between automatic negative affect and emotion 
condition, b = .15, t (159) = 2.10, p = .037. Simple slopes analysis revealed that participants with 
greater automatic negative affective responses toward African-Americans reported significantly 
more fear of African-Americans in the fear condition, b = .54, t (78) = 5.28, p < .001 and in the 
sympathy condition, b = .24, t (81) = 2.29, p = .025. Comparisons of the simple slopes, however, 
revealed that participants with greater automatic negative affective responses African-Americans 
reported less fear of African-Americans when in the sympathy condition rather than the fear 
condition, t (159) = 2.10, p < .05. 
 Additionally, I regressed endorsed sympathy for African-Americans onto automatic 
negative affect, emotion condition, and their interaction. As in Study 1, there was a main effect 
of automatic negative affect, b = -.39, t (159) = 5.38, p < .001. However, there was neither a 
main effect of emotion condition, b = .08, t (159) = 1.14, p = .25, nor an interaction effect, b = 
.02, t (159) = .20, p = .84.  
 Analysis of expanded emotion scales. Next, I examined the expanded world-focused 
fear scale. As with the original scales, I computed a score by taking the mean of the world-
focused items. Similarly, I computed scores for self-focused fear, world-focused sympathy, and 
self-focused sympathy using the relevant items (see Appendix for all items). I then regressed 
each emotion measure onto automatic negative affect, emotion condition, and their interaction. I 
predicted that individuals with greater automatic negative affect toward African-Americans 
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would endorse less fear of African-Americans if encouraged to interpret their feelings as 
sympathy, rather than fear. 
 For world-focused fear, participants with greater automatic negative affect toward 
African-Americans also endorsed more world-focused fear of African-Americans, b = .46, t 
(159) = 6.63, p < .001. There was no main effect of emotion condition, b = -.01, t (159) = .16, p 
= .87. Contrary to my predictions, there was no interaction effect, b = .09, t (159) = 1.29, p = .20. 
Similarly, for self-focused fear there was only a significant main effect of automatic negative 
affect, such that greater negative core affect predicted greater endorsement of self-focused fear of 
African-Americans b = .39, t (159) = 5.41, p < .001. But there was neither a main effect of 
emotion condition, b < -.01, t (159) = -.08, p = .93, nor the predicted interaction between 
automatic negative affect and emotion condition, b = .10, t (159) = 1.43, p = .15. 
 Participants also tended to endorse less world-focused sympathy for African-Americans 
if they showed greater automatic negative affect on the AMP, b = -.39, t (159) = 5.38, p < .001. 
But their responses on the world-focused sympathy items were not affected by emotion 
condition, b = .08, t (159) = 1.14, p = .25, or the interaction effect b = .02, t (159) = .20, p = .84. 
Similarly, for self-focused sympathy toward African-Americans, there was a main effect of 
automatic negative affect, b = -.40, t (159) = 5.54, p < .001, but no main effect of emotion 
condition, b = .01, t (159) = .17, p = .87. There was also no interaction effect, b < -.01, t (159) = 
.01, p < .95. 
 Explicit affect. I found a main effect of automatic negative affect, b =.51, t (159) = 7.54, 
p < .001 on explicit affect ratings toward the images of Black and White individuals. However, 
neither the main effect of emotion condition, b = .05, t (159) = .77, p = .44, nor the interaction, b 
= .10, t (159) = 1.45, p = .15, reached significance.  
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Discussion 
 As in Study 1, interpretation of automatic negative affect toward African-Americans as 
sympathy reduced the amount of reported fear toward African-Americans, but did not moderate 
the amount of reported sympathy on the original scales. Instead, reported sympathy was more 
directly related to automatic negative affect toward African-Americans in general. However, 
interpretation of automatic negative affect did not affect reports on the expanded scales 
examining world-focused fear and sympathy toward Blacks. Consistent with Study 1, I also 
found that participants with greater automatic negative affect toward African-Americans reported 
more negative explicit affect toward African-Americans in the fear condition. This finding, 
however, did not reach significance (p = .15). The additional items on the world-focused scales 
were broader than the original items. For example, the original items on the fear scale used 
language that was directly synonymous with fear (e.g., Blacks are threatening). In contrast, the 
additional items on the fear scale were broader and instead related to instances of fear or 
potentially causal of fear (e.g., Blacks are aggressive). This suggests that perhaps participants 
interpreted their automatic negative affect toward African-Americans in a way specific to fear 
and participants’ interpretations did not generalize beyond fear. Additionally, the fact that 
interpretation of automatic negative affect did not influence reported world-focused sympathy 
toward Blacks is consistent with the findings of Study 1. 
Interpretation of negative affect also did not moderate the relationship between automatic 
negative affect toward African-Americans and reported fear or sympathy toward Blacks on the 
self-focused scales. I expected that interpretation of automatic negative affect as fear would 
increase participants’ reported self-focused fear toward Blacks. As with the world-focused fear 
scale, this may be due to participants interpreting their emotions in a way specific to fear, which 
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does not generalize to the broader items on the scale. Another possibility is that participants 
tended to interpret their automatic negative affect in a world-focused, rather than self-focused 
way. Alternatively, participants might simply have been more reluctant to report fear when 
phrased in a self-focused way (e.g., I am frightened by Blacks), compared to a world-focused 
way (e.g., Blacks are frightening). Finally, the lack of moderation between automatic negative 
affect and reported self-focused sympathy by participants’ interpretations is consistent with the 
findings of Study 1, in which interpretation did not influence participants’ reported world-
focused sympathy.  
  
   




 In the current studies, I test a novel psychological constructionist theory of implicit 
prejudice. Consistent with previous studies (Cooley et al., 2014; Uhlmann, Brescoll, & Paluck, 
2006; Vorauer et al., 1998; Vorauer & Turpie, 2004) I found evidence that negative affect toward 
a racial minority group might have multiple meanings and that interpretation can shape the 
meaning of negative affect. Taken together, these findings support a psychological 
constructionist model of racial attitudes. In my proposed model, I argue that interpretation of 
core affect, situational information, and conceptual knowledge dynamically constructs an attitude 
to fit the present situation. My proposed model stands in contrast to previous assumptions that 
automatically activated racial attitudes produced fixed responses. 
 The results from Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that interpretation of negative affect toward 
African-Americans as sympathy reduces the relationship between automatic negative affect and 
self-reported fear of African-Americans. In Study 1, when participants interpreted their 
automatic negative affect toward African-Americans affect as sympathy, rather than fear, they 
reported less fear of Blacks. I replicated this effect in Study 2 with the original items from the 
fear of Blacks scale used in Study 1. However, interpretation of automatic negative affect as 
sympathy did not increase self-reported sympathy toward African-Americans in either study. The 
results of Study 1 also indicated that participants who interpreted their automatic negative affect 
as fear reported greater negative explicit affect toward African-Americans. I found similar 
effects in Study 2, but they bordered on marginal (p = .15). The expanded scales in Study 2 did 
not show the same pattern of results as the original scales. Instead, interpretation did not affect 
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relationship between automatic negative affect and self-reported self-focused or world-focused 
emotions toward African-Americans. 
The findings from Studies 1 and 2 are ultimately consistent with my psychological 
constructionist model. Specifically, these findings suggest that automatic negative affect is one 
source of information that people use to inform their attitudes about racial minorities. Although I 
did not manipulate automatic negative affect, the results demonstrate that automatic negative 
affect alone is not the determining factor influencing evaluations of racial minorities. Instead, 
interpretation can shape the evaluations that emerge from automatic negative affect toward 
African-Americans. Supportive of my psychological constructionist model, previous studies 
have demonstrated that situational information is another important factor that shapes 
evaluations of racial minorities. For example, in past studies participants evaluated African-
Americans positively on an indirect measure if they are presented in a church setting, rather than 
a prison setting (Wittenbrink et al., 2001). Similarly, participants made more positive evaluations 
of African-Americans presented in a prison setting if they appeared to be lawyers rather than 
prisoners (Barden et al., 2004). 
The role of situational information in shaping our evaluations of others is also consistent 
with findings from studies of visual perception. For example recent work suggests that the brain 
extracts salient context cues in scene perception to help facilitate visual perception of objects 
(e.g., Aminoff, Kveraga, & Bar, 2013; Bar, 2004; Bar et al., 2006; Bar, Aminoff, Mason, & 
Fenske, 2007). These context cues activate related concepts and associations stored in memory, 
which in turn shape how we make sense of visual information. In other words, Bar and 
colleagues argue that context cues can actually shape what we see. Bar (2004) uses the example 
of showing a blurry object with either a bathroom counter or a tool bench in the background. 
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When the object is placed in the context of a bathroom, it looks like a hair dryer, but when it is 
on a tool bench the object looks like a drill.  
Bar’s (2004) theory of visual perception suggests that physical features of an individual, 
such as skin tone, might also act as a context cue. For example, participants are more likely to 
mistake a harmless object for a weapon if a face of an African-American is flashed before the 
object than if a White face is flashed (Payne, 2001). The physical features of person can also act 
as a context cue for making judgments about the mental state of individuals. For example, White 
participants who showed greater negative racial attitudes on an indirect measure were faster to 
judge African-American faces as angry compared to White faces (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 
2003). Participants are also more likely to judge neutral African-American faces as angry 
compared to White faces (Shapiro et al., 2009). Study 2 yielded information partially consistent 
with these findings. In Study 2 the manipulation moderated the relationship between negative 
affect and the fear items from the original scale in Study 1, which involved direct synonyms of 
fear in a world-focused way. However, this effect did not extend to the expanded world-focused 
fear scale or self-focused fear scale. So, it is difficult to determine whether interpretation of 
negative affect changed participants’ perceptions of African-Americans or their feelings toward 
African-Americans. In other words, it is unclear whether interpretation of automatic negative 
affect as sympathy, rather than fear, led to world-focused or self-focused changes in participants’ 
experiences. Did interpretation reduce participants’ experiences of fear toward African-
Americans or make them perceive African-Americans as less threatening? Although the past 
literature suggests that interpretation changes participants’ evaluations of African-Americans in a 
world-focused way, my data do not provide a clear answer to this question. 
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Theoretical Implications 
Taken together, the findings from Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence consistent with the 
proposed psychological constructionist model of racial attitudes. Specifically, these findings 
provide empirical evidence that interpretation and application of conceptual knowledge can 
shape the meaning of automatic negative affect. Consistent with the psychological 
constructionist theories of emotion (Barrett, 2009; Lindquist, 2013), past research has also 
provided evidence that situational information such as perceived role, setting, and even skin tone 
play key roles in shaping the evaluations people make about racial minorities (Barden et al., 
2004; Bar, 2004; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; Payne, 2001; Shapiro et al., 2009; 
Wittenbrink et al., 2001). The proposed model is consistent with theories which view attitudes as 
products of dynamic processes, rather than fixed entities awaiting activation. For example, the 
Associative-Propositional Evaluation model views automatic processes as associations stored in 
memory (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). Gawronski and Bodenhausen argue that 
indirect measures capture the associations which are activated by stimuli. But, unlike the 
perspective where a stimulus has a set evaluation, Gawronski and Bodenhausen argue that the 
activation of associations is also dependent on the context in which one encounters a stimulus. In 
the Associative-Propositional Evaluation model, contextual cues determine which associations 
are activated when encountering a stimulus. According to Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2011), 
the associations stored in memory comprise information that is initially learned about an attitude 
object, information that is learned subsequently, and a mixture of the two. Importantly, 
Bodenhausen and Gawronski argue that different contextual information might be linked with 
particular associations one has with an attitude object. For example, a person might initially 
encode information about African-American males on a street corner as threatening, but later 
   
  34 
encode information about African-Americans in a church setting as friendly. According to 
Bodenhausen and Gawronski contextual information would therefore determine which 
associations are activated. 
 Overall, my model proposes that racial attitudes, and perhaps attitudes more broadly 
might be best characterized using a psychological constructionist framework. A psychological 
constructionist framework may provide a solution to the problem that attitudes appear both to be 
stable over time and sensitive to contextual information (Fazio, 2007; Petty et al., 2007; 
Schwarz, 2007). My model predicts that consistency of attitudes over time is the result 
interpretations of affective, situational, and conceptual information in similar ways. In contrast, 
changes in context may change how people interpret these different sources of information. For 
example, in a church setting, a person’s skin tone might be a less salient factor in generating an 
evaluation about that person. Alternatively, one might draw on different conceptual knowledge 
(e.g., African-Americans as church-goers) in generating an evaluation. 
Finally, my proposed model may provide a tractable solution for the seemingly 
intractable problems of prejudice and discrimination. Even the most optimistic theories of 
stereotyping and negative racial attitudes concede that cultural exposure will result in acquisition 
automatic negative affective responses to some racial minority groups (Devine, 1989). Most 
theories assume that activation of automatic negative affective responses to racial minorities 
necessarily leads to harmful evaluations and discriminatory behaviors (Banaji et al., 2004; Fazio 
et al., 1995; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Drawing from a perspective that attitudes are stable 
entities (Fazio, 1990, 2007; Petty, 2006; Petty et al., 2007), these theories of implicit prejudice 
also view implicit prejudice as something that is difficult to alter once acquired. In other words, 
many theories of implicit prejudice suggest that prejudice and discrimination are inevitable 
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consequences of simply existing in our society. According to my proposed model, however, 
negative racial attitudes may reflect an automatic tendency to interpret affective, situational, and 
conceptual information in a way that forms unfavorable or harmful evaluations of racial 
minorities emerge. Yet, the tendency to interpret information in a way that is hostile to racial 
minorities is far from immutable. The way in which individuals interpret affective and situational 
information is malleable. Therefore, through changing how they interpret this information a 
person might be able to interpret negative affect toward racial minorities in a way that results in 
pro-social rather than harmful evaluations of racial minorities. 
Conclusions 
 The traditionally, evidence of negative affect toward minority groups on indirect 
measures are interpreted as evidence of persistent negative racial attitudes stored in long-term 
memory. According to this perspective, these attitudes become active when one encounters a 
member of the minority group in question. But, the broader literature suggests a different 
interpretation of the data. Reponses on indirect measures might reflect general negative affective 
responses, which are not directed at minority group members. For example, negative affect might 
be tied to the anxiety or reflect sympathy. Further, indirect measures are sensitive to contextual 
cues, which challenge the idea that indirect measures reflect inflexible activation of evaluations 
stored in long-term memory. Rather, the current studies suggest that subjective interpretation of 
negative affect toward a minority group can alter the meaning of this negative affect. In 
particular, interpreting negative affect as a sign of sympathy can reduce reported fear of African-
Americans. These findings lend support for a psychological constructionist theory of implicit 
prejudice. In accord with the psychological constructionist perspective, prejudice arises when a 
person interprets affective, situational, and conceptual information as such. Given the 
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opportunity, however, a person can choose to interpret negative affective reactions to minority 
group members in pro-social ways. Ultimately, examining how individuals construct evaluations 
of racial minority groups may provide novel insight into the processes that drive negative 
evaluations of racial minorities and provide novel interventions for the supposedly inescapable 
problem of negative racial attitudes. 
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APPENDIX 1: FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between standardized AMP scores and standardized mean ratings score of 
































   
  38 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between standardized AMP scores and standardized difference scores for 
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Figure 3. Relationship between standardized AMP scores and standardized mean ratings score of 
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APPENDIX B: TABLE OF QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS 
Fear and Sympathy for Blacks Scales 
World-Focused Fear 
1. Blacks are threatening.* 
2. Blacks are scary.* 
3. Blacks are frightening.* 
4. Blacks are aggressive 
5. Blacks are hostile. 
6. Blacks are intimidating. 
7. Blacks are dangerous. 
8. Blacks are violent. 
World-Focused Sympathy 
9. Blacks continue to face oppression.* 
10. Blacks are unfairly looked down upon.* 
11. Blacks are unfairly harassed.* 
12. Blacks are warm. 
13. Blacks are dehumanized 
14. Blacks are exploited. 
15. Blacks are neglected. 
16. Blacks are marginalized 
Self-Focused Fear 
17. I am frightened by Blacks. 
18. I feel afraid around Blacks. 
19. I feel threatened when I am around Blacks. 
20. I feel anxious around Blacks. 
21. I feel nervous around Blacks. 
22. I feel suspicion toward Blacks. 
23. Seeing a group of Blacks makes me anxious. 
24. Encounters with Blacks make me uneasy. 
Self-Focused Sympathy 
25. I feel sympathetic towards Blacks. 
26. I feel warmth towards Blacks. 
27. I feel compassion towards Blacks. 
28. I feel bad for Blacks. 
29. I feel sorry for Blacks. 
30. I feel concern for Blacks. 
31. I feel pity for Blacks. 
32. I empathize with Blacks. 
Note. Items with * beside them reflect original scale used in Study 1 and the replication analyses in Study 2. 
Participants responded to all items using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Never True) to 5 (Always True). 
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